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INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems,
(hereinafter "Petitioner" or "UAMPS"), respectfully replies to
the Brief of Respondents, Public Service Commission of Utah
("PSC"), Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L"), and the Utility
Shareholders of Utah (the "Shareholders").

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Petitioner and Respondents agree that the "correctionof-error" standard should govern this Court's review of the
facial constitutionality of Section 11-13-27 of the Utah
Interlocal Co-operation Act ("Interlocal Act").

Petitioner and

Respondents disagree, however, on the standard to be applied in
reviewing whether Section 11-13-27 was unconstitutionally
applied by the PSC.
Respondents argue that the issue combines both
questions of law and fact.

Therefore, Respondents suggest that

the PSC's application of the statute should be upheld if it is
"reasonable."

Petitioner disagrees.

The question of whether

Section 11-13-27 was unconstitutionally applied is purely a
legal issue.

The issue is not, as suggested by Respondents,

whether the PSC correctly interpreted the facts surrounding the
construction and operation of the transmission line, the effect
of the project on the overall public interest, and the adverse

effect on the customers of UAMPSf member municipalities.
Rather, the question is whether the PSC is constitutionally
empowered to consider those factors at all.

Determination of

the issue is dependent solely on the parameters of Article VI,
§ 28 of the Utah Constitution.

There is simply no factual

component involved.
This Court has consistently held that constitutional
interpretation is a question of general law:
[gjeneral questions of law include the
interpretation of the Utah Constitution and
covers questions regarding whether the PSC has
regularly pursued its authority and whether it
has violated any constitutional . . . rights of
the petitioner.
Utah Dep't of Admin. Services v. Public Service Comm'n, 658
P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983).
the

Therefore, this Court should apply

,?

correction-of-error" standard when determining whether the

PSC violated UAMPS1 constitutional rights by considering
factors which are within the sole discretion of UAMPSf
municipal members.

As such, the PSCfs decision should be

accorded no deference.

See St. Francis Hospital Center v.

Heckler, 714 F.2d 872, 873 (7th Cir. 1983) (judicial deference
to administrative expertise does not extend to judging the
constitutionality of a statute or regulatory scheme).
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ARGUMENT
A.

THE FILING OF A JOINT BRIEF BY RESPONDENTS
UP&L, THE SHAREHOLDERS, AND THE PSC IS AN
IMPERMISSIBLE EX PARTE CONTACT

Petitioner objects to the filing of a joint brief by
the PSC, UP&L and the Shareholders.

Such joint action would

appear to violate the Utah Code's prohibition against ex parte
contacts between PSC employees and parties in interest.
Section 54-7-1.5 of the Utah Code specifically states:
No member of the Public Service Commission.
. . or commission employee who is or may
reasonably be expected to be involved in the
decision making process, shall make or knowingly
cause to be made to any party any communication
relevant to the merits of any matter under
adjudication unless notice and an opportunity to
be heard are afforded to all parties. No party
shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any
member of the commission . . . or commission
employee who is or may reasonably be expected to
be involved in the decision making process, an ex
parte communication relevant to the merits of any
matter under adjudication. Any member of the
commission . . . or commission employee who
receives an ex parte communication shall place
the communication into the public record of the
proceedings and afford all parties an opportunity
to comment on the information.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-1.5.
Petitioner does not allege the existence of ex parte
contacts during the actual hearing before the PSC.

Petitioner

notes, however, that issues related to this appeal are still
pending before the PSC, including the question of whether UAMPS
will be afforded joint participation in the UP&L transmission
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line.

Therefore, this matter is still under

ff

adjudication" for

purposes of the above-quoted section.
The Court need only read the Respondents' brief to
become aware of the intricate legal and factual discussions
that must have occurred between attorneys for the PSC and
UP&L.

Such communications give the appearance of an improper

ex parte relationship between the PSC and UP&L.
B.

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES
RAISED IN THIS APPEAL.

Respondents allege that this Court lacks jurisdiction
over Petitioner's appeal on the grounds that UAMPS failed to
challenge the constitutionality of Section 11-13-27 in its
Rehearing Petition.

Brief of Respondents at p. 17.

Respondents' assertion is unfounded.

Contrary to Respondents'

assertion, UAMPS' Petition specifically alleged that the PSC
was constitutionally prohibited from interfering with the
municipal functions of UAMPS and its member cities.

An entire

section of UAMPS' Petition focused on the argument that "[t]he
Commission Has no Authority to Make a Finding Based on the
Rates Paid by Ratepayers of Municipal Utilities."
Petitioners, Addendum "G" at 8.
that:
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Brief of

UAMPS specifically contended

[t]he determination of what is or is not an
appropriate rate, including what should or should
not go into rates, is reserved to the
municipality itself. Under the Constitution, the
Commission cannot interfere with that
determination. Logan City v. Public Utilities
Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 P. 961 (1928). For
a detailed analysis, see pages 66-70 of the
Post-Hearing Brief of UAMPS filed with the
Commission on August 4, 1986 in the captioned
matter.
Id. at 8-9 (Emphasis added).
It is important to note that UAMPS was not attempting
to raise the constitutional challenge to PSC jurisdiction for
the first time in its Rehearing Petition.

To the contrary, the

PSCTs constitutional authority over UAMPS was a central issue
throughout the proceeding.

UAMPS first raised its

constitutional challenge in its Original Application.

In its

Amended Verified Application, UAMPS stated:
UAMP is submitting this application under the
authority of Utah Code Ann. §11-13-27.
However, UAMPS does not, by this application,
concede the constitutionality of or otherwise
waive its right to object to the foregoing
statute.
Brief of Petitioner, Addendum "DfT at paragraph 6 (Emphasis
added).
PSC.

The issue was also fully briefed and presented to the

See Brief of Petitioner, Addendum "E" at pp. 10-15.

In

its Brief, UAMPS specifically contended that the "Commission
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should rule that the statute is unconstitutional/'
10.

lEd. at

UP&L and the Shareholders themselves requested the PSC to

rule on UAMPST constitutional challenge.

See Shareholders1

Proposal for Scheduling or Alternatively, Petition for
Rehearing dated August 30, 1985, Record at 008883; UP&Lfs
Motion for Summary Procedures and Stay of Proceedings, dated
July 17, 1985, Record at 008810.
Additionally, the PSC fully considered the issue, and
on October 24, 1985, ruled that Section 11-13-27 was
constitutional:
We were also asked to consider the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. 11-13-1, et
seq. as it concerns the creation and functioning
of UAMPS. A number of the parties have taken
the position that the Commission may not decide
the constitutionality of a regulatory statute
but, rather, must give it an irrebuttable
presumption of constitutionality. . . .
Certainly we presume in every case before us that
the statutory enactments of the Legislature are
constitutional but such a presumption is not
irrebuttable. (Citations omitted.)
Although we conclude that we can, where
necessary, consider constitutional issues, we
decline to set aside the presumption of
constitutionality in this case because we are not
persuaded by the parties that it is warranted.
Brief of Respondents, Exhibit "Hf? at pp. 4-5 (Emphasis added).
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When placed in context, there can be little doubt that
UAMPS' Rehearing Petition was sufficient to meet the
jurisdictional prerequisites of Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15.
C.

SECTION 11-13-27 OF THE INTERLOCAL ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE.

Respondents suggest that although UAMPS is an
organization of municipalities, it nevertheless participates
"in activities of statewide concern."

Inherent in Respondents'

assertion is the suggestion that UAMPS intends to provide

Even assuming Petitioner's Rehearing Petition was
insufficiently complete to confer jurisdiction upon this Court,
the Court may nonetheless address the merits of the action. In
Williams v. Public Service Comm'n, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988),
this Court stated:
Although we have not subject matter jurisdiction
over the administrative actions, we deal with the
contentions raised therein for several reasons.
First, this approach allows for the most
expeditious solution to the dispute between the
parties. All questions were thoroughly briefed
and fully presented to the Court. . . . Finally,
this approach is not without precedent.
Williams, 754 P.2d at 49 n.9 (citations omitted).
Williams is applicable here. The constitutional issues
were fully briefed and presented to the Court. Moreover,
if the Court rules on UAMPS claim, it will dispose of
issues which will certainly reoccur between UAMPS, UP&L
and the PSC in the future.
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utility services to consumers outside the municipal boundaries
of its member cities.

Respondents are wrong in that assessment

for a number of reasons.
First, UAMPS was created to allow municipalities to
supply more cost efficient electric power to their citizens.
Indeed, the specific purpose underlying the creation of UAMPS,
as expressed in the Interlocal Act, was to:
permit local governments to make the most
efficient use of their powers by enabling them to
cooperate with other localities on a basis of
mutual advantage and thereby to provide services
and facilities in a manner . . . that will accord
best with geographic, economic, population and
other factors influencing the needs and
development of local communities. . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-2 (emphasis added).

The fact that

UAMPS1 proposed transmission line would be owned and operated
by a group of cities rather than individual cities in no way
diminishes UAMPST central purpose of supplying electric power
to its member municipalities.

The primary purpose of UAMP ? S

proposed transmission line was to meet the needs of municipal
electric consumers of southwestern Utah.

Municipal or

cooperative loads comprise in excess of 81 percent of the total
electric loads in Washington County.

Brief of Petitioners,

Addendum MFff at p. 18.
Second, although UAMPS purchases and sells power on
the wholesale market, it does so to benefit its member
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municipalities.

It should be noted that such sales by UP&L are

not subject to PSC jurisdiction, either.

16 U.S.C § 2612

(1985).
Respondents also suggest that even though UAMPS ? only
members are municipalities, UAMPS is nonetheless a nseparate
body politic.f?

As such, Respondents contend that UAMPS

possesses no inherent municipal powers which would prevent its
regulation by the PSC.

Contrary to the suggestion of

Respondents, quasi-municipal corporations, including those
organized under the Interlocal Act, are embodied with municipal
powers and functions.

As this Court has stated, a

quasi-municipal corporation "is an agency of the state vested
with some of the powers and attributes of a municipality.ff
Lehi City v. Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 48 P.2d 530, 541 (1935)
(Emphasis added).

In this regard, UAMPS is embodied with those

collective municipal powers necessary to provide utility
services to its member cities.
Respondents rely on the case of Lehi City v. Meiling,
48 P.2d at 530, for the proposition that Article VI, Section 28
of the Utah Constitution does not prevent PSC regulation of
quasi-municipal corporations similar to UAMPS.
reliance on Lehi City is unfounded.

Respondents'

In Lehi City, the issue

presented to the Court was not whether a state agency was
constitutionally prohibited from regulating a quasi-municipal
corporation.

Rather, the question was whether cities were
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constitutionally prevented from becoming members of
quasi-municipal corporations.

Therefore, the question of

whether a state agency could regulate the municipal functions
of a quasi-municipal corporation was never presented to the
Court.
In upholding the authority of cities to join with
quasi-municipal corporations, the Lehi City Court expressly
recognized the practical necessity of cities banding together
in order to provide utility services to their citizens.
Referring to the supply of water, the Lehi City Court stated:
The [Colorado River Water Project] is of such
magnitude and the need for water by many cities
so great that it was impracticable, if not
impossible, for any one of the cities to
undertake the project alone. Provision therefore
was made for concerted action on the part of the
municipalities through a new and different
corporation by means of which many cities and
towns would cooperate in obtaining an increased
water supply . . . .
Because of the magnitude of
the project, its success depends on the united
resources and efforts of the cities, towns, and
other water users within the area which can be
served.
Lehi City, 48 P.2d at 534.
D.

SECTION 11-13-27 WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
APPLIED BY THE PSC.

Many of the factors identified by the PSC in its March
Order involve policy considerations which have been
constitutionally assigned to the exclusive discretion of the
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municipalities themselves.

If the PSC is allowed to exercise

jurisdiction over UAMPS in such a manner, UAMPSf members would
be stripped of their constitutional right to conduct their own
2
affairs.
Respondents counter with two basic points. First,
Respondents allege that the PSC has a general statutory mandate
to consider the interests of all Utah citizens.
does not dispute this statutory directive.

Petitioner

However, the issue

is not whether Section 11-13-27 commands the PSC to consider
the interests of all statewide electric consumers.

Rather, the

issue is whether the PSC may consider factors which

As the Utah Supreme Court noted in the Logan City case:
To say a municipality, its taxpayers and
citizens, have the right to own and operate a
utility, but may not be permitted to operate it
at a rate less than a privately owned utility
. . . is, in effect, to deny to a municipality
whatever advantage or ability it may have, if
any, to furnish and supply the product at a rate
or charge lower than that of a privately owned
utility for gain and profit.
Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm'n., 72 Utah 536, 271 P. at
969 (1928). It follows that the PSC may not interfere with a
municipality's right to charge those utility rates which are
high enough to allow the city to recover its investment in the
necessary transmission facilities, and which allow the city to
use the most economic resources available.
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have been constitutionally determined to be within the
exclusive discretion of municipal sovereigns.

Respondents'

point simply begs the question.
Second, Respondents allege that the PSC ? s factual
findings, unrelated to UAMPS, are sufficient to support the
PSCfs Order.

Again, this point begs the question.

The issue

is not whether the PSCfs factual determination is supported by
the Record.

UAMPS has not appealed the PSC?s findings.

The

key point is whether the PSC considered factors outside its
jurisdictional authority and violated the constitutional rights
of UAMPS and its member cities.
Respondents cite no case which contradicts the
authority of Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm T n., 72 Utah
536, 271 P. 961 (1928) and Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321,
279 P. 878 (1928).

These cases are controlling authority for

the proposition that the PSC exceeded its jurisdiction when it
considered policy considerations assigned solely to the
discretion of municipal government.
E.

THE ISSUES RAISED BY THIS APPEAL ARE NOT
MOOT .

Respondents allege that Petitioner's claim is moot.
The basis for Respondents' claim is that the 20 mile
transmission line has been built and that UP&L is presently in
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the process of constructing the larger 345 kV transmission line
authorized by the December Order.

Respondents' claim is

factually incorrect and disengenous at best.
The rights of UAMPS in and to the new larger line are
still pending before the PSC and will be profoundly effected by
the outcome of this appeal.

Although UP&L has commenced

construction of the larger 345 kV transmission line, the PSCTs
December Order allowing UP&L to begin construction was
specifically conditioned upon Petitioner being granted an
3
ownership interest in the new larger line.
The December
Order states:
The Commission recognizes that UAMPS and DG&T seek an
ownership interest in the line and further maintain
that this certificate should be conditioned on their
being granted such an ownership interest.
Brief of Respondents, Exhibit

ff ff

E

at p. 5.

The PSC has

maintained jurisdiction over this issue and it will be resolved
in a separate docket as established by the December Order:
Accordingly, this order authorizing such
construction, expressly does not alter the status
quo with respect to the joint use and ownership

3
Petitioner is particularly concerned by the allegations
of Respondents. Petitioner did not object to UP&Lfs
Application because UAMPS and UP&L were negotiating joint
ownership in the new line. Petitioner successfully urged the
PSC to maintain jurisdiction over the joint ownership issue.
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issues as established in the Order dated March 3,
1987, in Case Nos. 85-2011-01 and 87-999-08.
All issues regarding potential joint use or
ownership in the subject 345 kV transmission
facilities and associated 138 kV system will be
considered in a separate part (Phase II) of this
proceeding in the event the parties are unable to
reach an agreement. All issues respecting the
Commission's jurisdiction to order such use or
ownership are reserved for consideration in such
proceeding. The parties should continue
negotiations and report the status of the same.
Brief of Respondents, Exhibit "E" at pp. 5-6 (Emphasis added).
A case is moot only "if the requested judicial relief
cannot affect the rights of the litigants."

Black v. Alpha

Financial Corp., 656 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1982) (citing Puran
v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981)).

Here, however, the

Court's decision will profoundly effect the rights of
Petitioner in and to the transmission lines which were at issue
before the PSC.
moot.

As such, Petitioner's case is clearly not

See Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659

P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) (holding that case was not moot in light
of the fact that lienholders were not seeking to prevent a
foreclosure sale, which in fact had already occurred, but, were
seeking to establish their right to a share of sale proceeds,

-14-

which relief could be granted even though sale was already
completed).
F.

SECTION 11-13-27 MAY BE SEVERED FROM THE
INTERLOCAL ACT.

Respondents raise the issue of whether Section
11-13-27 may be severed from the Interlocal Act.

Respondents

do not, however, "encourage the far-reaching consequences" of
holding the Interlocal Act unconstitutional in its entirety.
Presumably, therefore, the issue is not on appeal.

Even if Petitioner's case were moot, two exceptions to
the mootness doctrine would support this Court's decision to
entertain the issues raised by Petitioner's appeal. First, a
court may maintain jurisdiction over a moot appeal if the
matter involved is one of public interest. McRae
v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1974). Here, the
constitutional issue of the PSC's authority to regulate
municipal utility services is of the utmost public importance.
Second, an appeal should not be dismissed as moot if the
issues are likely to recur in the future. Orwick v. City of
Seattle, 103 Wash. 2d 249, 692 P.2d 793 (1984); Marquette v.
Marquette, 686 P.2d 990 (Okla. App. 1984); John A. v. San
Bernadino City Unified School Dist., 33 Cal. 3d. 301, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 472, 654 P.2d 242 (1982); New Mexico Press Ass'n v.
Kaufman, 98 N.M. 261, 648 P.2d 300 (1982). Without a ruling
on the constitutionality of Section 11-13-27, the probability
of UAMPS appearing again before the PSC is virtually guaranteed
if UAMPS desires to construct another transmission line.
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Nonetheless, it is clear that Section 11-13-27 may be severed
without invalidating the entire act.
A constitutionally invalid statutory provision may be
severed if the remaining statutory provisions are 'capable of
fulfilling legislative intent.

Matheson v. Ferry, 657 P.2d

240 (Utah 1982); Utah v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 66, 426 P.2d 13,
14 (1967); Salt Lake City v. International Ass'n of
Firefighters, 563 P.2d 786 (Utah 1977).

As manifest in

Section 11-13-2, the essential purpose of the Interlocal Act is
to provide a means by which municipalities may provide better
utility services to their residents.

PSC review of UAMPS?

The purpose of the Interlocal Act as expressed in
Section 11-13-2 is:
to permit local governmental units to make the
most efficient use of their powers by enabling
them to co-operate with other localities on a
basis of mutual advantage and thereby to provide
services and facilities in a manner and pursuant
to forms of governmental organization that will
accord best with geographic, economic, population
and other factors influencing the needs and
developments of local communities and to provide
the benefit of economy of scale, economic
development and utilization of natural resources
for the overall promotion of the general welfare
of the State.
Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-2.
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decisions is clearly a secondary and severable purpose.

For

instance, Section 11-13-27 authorizes the PSC to review only
M

the construction of any electrical generating plant or

transmission line."

Utah Code Ann. § 11-13-27.

The Section

does not grant the PSC jurisdiction over UAMPS* other
activities such as their contracts and power pooling
arrangements with their members.

Additionally, Section

11-13-27 exempts from PSC regulation power projects commenced
prior to the effective date of the act.

Therefore, the

legislature specifically exempted from regulation the massive
generating facility being constructed by Intermountain Power
Agency (IPA).

If the Legislature intended to establish PSC

oversight as a necessary "condition precedent" to the formation
of quasi-municipal corporations formed to supply electric
power, the legislature surely would have extended PSC
jurisdiction to all facets of a quasi-municipal corporation's
activities, as well as the IPA generating facility.
Respondent's argument concerning severability is even
less persuasive when applied to Petitioner's argument that
Section 11-13-27 was unconstitutionally applied by the PSC.

If

this Court were to hold that the PSC unconstitutionally applied
Section 11-13-27, the PSC would still maintain jurisdiction
over UAMPS for purposes of approving certificates of
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convenience.

In determining whether to grant the certificate,

the PSC would only be constrained from considering factors
within the exclusive discretion of municipal government.
Therefore, even assuming that PSC review of the statewide
impact of UAMPS? utility decisions was an integral legislative
purpose of the Interlocal Act, that purpose would not be
undermined by preventing the PSC from evaluating the decisions
of UAMPS which have a local effect on individual municipalities.
G.

RESPONDENTS MAY NOT REACH BEHIND THE PSCTs
FINDINGS OF FACT.

Throughout their brief, Respondents reach behind the
PSC's findings of fact and attempt to bolster their legal
arguments with factual testimony.

The Court should disallow

these assertions since UAMPS has not appealed the PSC's factual
findings.

Respondents should not be allowed to go behind the

PSC's findings and present portions of the record which present
their case in the most positive light.

Additionally,

Respondent's factual assertions should be ignored because they
are irrelevant to the legal issues presented the Court.

As

mentioned previously, the question of the constitutionality of
Section 11-13-27, both facially and in its ar. lication, is a
purely legal question.

Therefore, the factual assertions of

Respondents simply cannot aid this Court in deciding the issues
raised by this appeal.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, UAMPS respectfully requests
this Court to hold that Section 11-13-27 is unconstitutional,
both facially and as applied by the PSC.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

9^

day of November,

1988.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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Attorneys for Petitioner Utah
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110988
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